This document proposes the use of OAuth to obtain and validate ephemeral tokens that can be used for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) authentication. The usage of ephemeral tokens ensure that access to a STUN server can be controlled even if the tokens are compromised.
Introduction
Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] provides a mechanism to control access via "long-term" username/ password credentials that are provided as part of the STUN protocol. It is expected that these credentials will be kept secret; if the credentials are discovered, the STUN server could be used by unauthorized users or applications. However, in web applications, ensuring this secrecy is typically impossible.
To address this problem and the ones described in [I-D.ietf-tram-auth-problems], this document proposes the use of third party authorization using OAuth for STUN. Using OAuth, a client obtains an ephemeral token from an authorization server e.g. WebRTC server, and the token is presented to the STUN server instead of the traditional mechanism of presenting username/password credentials. The STUN server validates the authenticity of the token and provides required services.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
o WebRTC Server: A web server that supports WebRTC [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview].
o Access Token: OAuth 2.0 access token.
o mac_key: The session key generated by the authorization server. This session key has a lifetime that corresponds to the lifetime of the access token, is generated by the authorization server and bound to the access token.
o kid: An ephemeral and unique key identifier. The kid also allows the resource server to select the appropriate keying material for decryption.
Solution Overview
This specification uses the token type 'Assertion' (aka selfcontained token) described in [RFC6819] where all the information necessary to authenticate the validity of the token is contained within the token itself. This approach has the benefit of avoiding a protocol between the STUN server and the authorization server for token validation, thus reducing latency. The exact mechanism used by a client to obtain a token from the OAuth authorization server is outside the scope of this document. For example, a client could make an HTTP request to an authorization server to obtain a token that can be used to avail STUN services. The STUN token is returned in JSON, along with other OAuth Parameters like token type, mac_key, kid, token lifetime etc. The client is oblivious to the content of the token. The token is embedded within a STUN request sent to the STUN server. Once the STUN server has determined the token is valid, it's services are offered for a determined period of time. | ////// integrity protected ////// | | Note : An implementation may choose to contact the WebRTC server to obtain a token even before it makes a STUN request, if it knows the server details before hand. For example, once a client has learnt that a STUN server supports Third Party authorization from a WebRTC server, the client can obtain the token before making subsequent STUN requests.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] describes the interaction between the client and the authorization server. For example, the client learns the STUN server name "stun1@example.com" from THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute value and makes the following HTTP request for the access token using transport-layer security (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): Consider the following example that illustrates the use of OAuth to achieve third party authorization for TURN. In this example, a resource owner i.e. WebRTC server, authorizes a TURN client to access resources on a TURN server. Using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework, a WebRTC client (thirdparty application) obtains limited access to a TURN (resource server) on behalf of the WebRTC server (resource owner or authorization server). The WebRTC client requests access to resources controlled by the resource owner (WebRTC server) and hosted by the resource server (TURN server). The WebRTC client obtains access token, lifetime, session key (in the mac_key parameter) and key id (kid). The TURN client conveys the access token and other OAuth parameters learnt from the authorization server to the resource server (TURN server). The TURN server obtains the session key from the access token. The TURN server validates the token, computes the message integrity of the request and takes appropriate action i.e permits the |
User : Alice ****: Out-of-Band Long-Term Key Establishment The authorization server shares a long-term secret (like asymmetric credentials) with the resource server for mutual authentication. The STUN server and authorization server MUST establish a symmetric key (K), using an out of band mechanism. Symmetric key MUST be chosen to ensure that the size of encrypted token is not large because usage of asymmetric keys will result in large encrypted tokens which may not fit into a single STUN message. The AS-RS, AUTH keys will be derived from K. AS-RS key is used for encrypting the self-contained token and message integrity of the encrypted token is calculated using the AUTH key. The STUN and authorization servers MUST establish the symmetric key over an authenticated secure channel. 
HTTP interactions
The two servers could choose to use REST API to establish a symmetric key. To retrieve a new symmetric key, the STUN server makes an HTTP GET request to the authorization server, specifying STUN as the service to allocate the symmetric keys for, and specifying the name of the STUN server. The response is returned with content-type "application/json", and consists of a JSON object containing the symmetric key. example: { "key" : "ESIzRFVmd4iZABEiM0RVZgKn6WjLaTC1FXAghRMVTzkBGNaaN496523WIISKerLi", "ttl" : 86400, "kid" :"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb" } The AS-RS, AUTH keys are derived from K using HKDF as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Authorization server must also signal a unique key identifier (kid) to the STUN server which will be used to select the appropriate keying material for decryption. The default encryption algorithm to encrypt the self-contained token could be Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode (AES_256_CBC). The default HMAC algorithm to calculate the integrity of the token could be HMAC-SHA-256-128. In this case AS-RS key length must be 256-bit, AUTH key length must be 256-bit (section 2.6 of [RFC4868] [RFC5389] where the mac_key is used as the input key for the HMAC computation. The STUN client and server will use the mac_key to compute the message integrity and doesn't have to perform MD5 hash on the credentials.
STUN Attributes
The following new STUN attributes are introduced by this specification to accomplish third party authorization.
THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION
This attribute is used by the STUN server to inform the client that it supports third party authorization. This attribute value contains the STUN server name. The STUN server may have tie-up with multiple authorization servers and vice versa, so the client MUST provide the STUN server name to the authorization server so that it can select the appropriate keying material to generate the self-contained token. The THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute is a comprehension-optional attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389]).
ACCESS-TOKEN
The access token is issued by the authorization server. OAuth does not impose any limitation on the length of the access token but if path MTU is unknown then STUN messages over IPv4 would need to be less than 548 bytes (Section 7.1 of [RFC5389] ), access token length needs to be restricted to fit within the maximum STUN message size. Note that the self-contained token is opaque to the client and it MUST NOT examine the ticket. The ACCESS-TOKEN attribute is a comprehension-required attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389] ).
The token is structured as follows: mac_key: The session key generated by the authorization server.
timestamp: 64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp. The value indicates the time since January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC, by using a fixed point format. In this format, the integer number of seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a second (Native format -Unix).
lifetime: The lifetime of the access token, in seconds. For example, the value 3600 indicates one hour. The Lifetime value SHOULD be equal to the "expires_in" parameter defined in section 4.2.2 of [RFC6749] .
encrypted_block: The encrypted_block is encrypted using the symmetric long-term key established between the resource server and the authorization server. Shown in Figure 5 as AS-RS key. Encryption is applied before message authentication on the sender side and conversely on the receiver side. The entire token i.e., the 'encrypted_block' and 'mac' is base64 encoded (see section 4 of [RFC4648] ) and the resulting access token is signaled to the client. If AEAD algorithm is used then there is no need to explicitly compute HMAC, the associated data MUST be the STUN server name (N) and the mac field MUST carry the nonce. The length of nonce MUST be 12 octets.
Receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute
The STUN server, on receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute, performs checks listed in section 10.2.2 of [RFC5389] in addition to the following steps to verify that the access token is valid:
o STUN server selects the keying material based on kid signalled in the USERNAME attribute.
o It performs the verification of the token message integrity by calculating HMAC over the encrypted portion in the self-contained token and STUN server name using AUTH key and if the resulting value does not match the mac field in the self-contained token then it rejects the request with an error response 401 (Unauthorized). If AEAD algorithm is used then it has only a single output, either a plaintext or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are not authentic.
o STUN server obtains the mac_key by retrieving the content of the access token (which requires decryption of the self-contained token using the AS-RS key).
o The STUN server verifies that no replay took place by performing the following check:
* The access token is accepted if the timestamp field (TS) in the self-contained token is recent enough to the reception time of o If all the checks pass, the STUN server continues to process the request. Any response generated by the server MUST include the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute, computed using the mac_key.
Changes to STUN Client
o A STUN response is discarded by the client if the value computed for message integrity using mac_key does not match the contents of the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute.
o If the access token expires then the client MUST obtain a new token from the authorization server and use it for new STUN requests.
Usage with TURN
Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) [RFC5766] an extension to the STUN protocol is often used to improve the connectivity of P2P applications. By providing a cloud-based relay service, TURN ensures that a connection can be established even when one or both sides is incapable of a direct P2P connection. However, as a relay service, it imposes a nontrivial cost on the service provider. Therefore, access to a TURN service is almost always access-controlled. In order to achieve third party authorization, a resource owner e.g. WebRTC server, authorizes a TURN client to access resources on the TURN server.
o The access token can be reused for multiple Allocate requests to the same TURN server. The TURN client MUST include the ACCESS-TOKEN attribute only in Allocate and Refresh requests. Since the access token is only valid for a specific period of time, the TURN server MUST cache it so that it need not to be provided in every request within an existing allocation.
o The lifetime provided by the TURN server in the Allocate and Refresh responses MUST be less than or equal to the lifetime of the token.
o If the access token expires then the client MUST obtain a new token from the authorization server and use it for new allocations. The client MUST use the new token to refresh existing allocations. This way client has to maintain only one token per TURN server.
Security Considerations
When OAuth is used the interaction between the client and the authorization server requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a ciphersuite offering confidentiality protection. The session key MUST NOT be transmitted in clear since this would completely destroy the security benefits of the proposed scheme. If an attacker tries to replay message with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute then the server can detect that the transaction ID as used for an old request and thus prevent the replay attack. The client may know some (but not all) of the token fields encrypted with a unknown secret key and the token can be subjected to known-plaintext attack, but AES is secure against this attack. 
